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Resumo
Esse artigo testa se o Orçamento Participativo (OP) adotado por alguns municípios no
Brasil teve algum impacto sobre a eficiência dos municípios ou sobre a distribuição de
renda usando uma abordagem “quasi-experimental”. Os resultados são contraditórios mas
apontam que o OP pode estar deteriorando a eficiência dos gastos em saúde dos municípios
sem apresentar impactos positivos sobre a arrecadação. Um hipótese explicativa seria que o
programa foi dominado por grupos de interesse que estariam captando mais renda do estado
do que a coalizão anterior. Por outro lado, há alguma evidência de que houve um ganho de
eficiência no fornecimento de educação pública o que confirmaria a hipótese alternativa
que o OP quebrou uma coalizão perversa entre burocratas e a elite.
Palavras-chave: orçamento participativo, governância, experimento, democracia,
empoderamento.
Abstract
This paper tests whether the Participatory Budget (OP) adopted by some municipalities in
Brazil had any impact on the municipality efficiency or on income distribution using a
quasi experimental approach. The results are mixed but they do show that OP
municipalities may be deteriorating the quality of the health service delivery with no
positive impact on the fiscal performance of the municipality. One explanatory hypothesis
is that the program was dominated by groups of interest that are capturing more rent from
the state than the former coalition. On the other hand there are some evidences of an
improving in the efficiency of public education service what would confirm the alternative
hypothesis that the OP broke the collusion between bureaucrats and the elite.
Key words: participation, governance, experiment, democracy, empowerment.  1





Starting in 1989 the new elected mayors in Brazil proposed an alternative for the budget 
proposal and approving process. Part of the budget would be decided in meetings open 
to all citizenship as happened in Porto Alegre one of the early adopters of the program. 
The change in the budget implementation following this scheme was generically 
referred as “Orçamento Participativo” (Participatory Budget - hereafter OP). In this 
paper it is assumed that the OP may represents an institutional change that represents a 
non-linear break in the public management. This paper argues that the OP is a change in 
the institutional infrastructure of governance. 
 
Governance is defined very loosely in this paper but it is supposed to be mainly 
concerned with the “laws of the game” to use a game-theory jargon. In the broad 
conceptual framework of the “New Institutional Economics”, using Williamson (2000) 
survey, governance will be in the “third level scheme” of institutions. The first level is 
the most basic and is related to religion, social costumes and norms. It needs centuries 
to change. The second level is the institutional environment and is composed by the 
main laws such as the constitutions. It is expected to take decades to change. The third 
level sets the stage for playing the game. It includes the choice of appropriate schemes 
of governance for each type of transaction or organization. The forth and lowest level 
includes routine economic interactions such as production, employment, etc. 
 
The appropriate scheme of governance proposed in Williamson (1979) seminal paper is 
the one that minimizes transaction costs. Why would participatory democracy save in 
transaction costs compared to representative democracy? One possibility is that 
participatory democracy may be the less costly way to find out the citizens’ preferences. 
However, given Arrow paradox, it is impossible to prove that participatory democracy 
will necessarily reveal the citizens’ preferences because depending on the order of the 
votes or the hierarchy the election may have different outcomes. In this paper it is 
hypothesized that the OP may reduce the cost of revealing citizens’ preferences but that 
this is an empirical question to be tested. 
 
So, the new institutional economics recognized a long time ago that inefficient forms of 
governance may retard economic growth and do not favor income distribution. Another 
branch of the literature deals more explicitly with the question why some societies are 
stuck with such inefficient institutional infrastructure of governance. Acemoglu, Ticchi 
and Vindigni (2006) show that, under certain circumstances, by choosing an inefficient 
state structure, the elite may be able to use patronage and capture the politicians. This 
enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision even in 
democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to 
persist over time. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform the 
structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at 
lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Assuming that the participation in the 
OP process in Brazil is biased toward the poor, it is possible to expect, using this 
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framework, both an increase in efficiency as in income distribution. Except if other 
groups have captured the participatory process as well
1. 
 
The main attempt of this paper is testing whether the OP adopted by some 
municipalities in Brazil had any impact on the municipality efficiency or on distribution. 
In other words, it will test if the OP has reduced transaction cost of public management 
or the capture of the government by groups of interest. The idea is that people 
participating in the budget decision will be more willing to pay local taxes since (the 
argument goes) the citizens have more control over the allocation decision. It is also 
expected that there would be a general improvement in social conditions. There are two 
reasons for expecting better social outcomes in municipalities implementing OP. First, 
the OP opens space for the participation of the poor that may have less lobby power 
than the rich. Second its potential capacity to improve the quality of public spending. If 
citizens take part in the process of implementing municipality budget, government 
spending would be closer to their demands. That is, there might be “Pareto 
improvement” reallocations in the public budget that the local government would not 
find out unless “directly asking” the citizens. 
 
The argument is reasonable but debatable. What is interesting about this discussion is 
that some of the claims made in the policy debate summarized above are testable using 
the panel built for this purpose and presented below. There is a rare opportunity since it 
is possible to pool together relevant data about the municipalities for 1991/1992, 1996 
and 2000. Those are the last year of the tenures that took place between 1989 and 1992 
(first generation of OP); 1993 and 1996; and 1997 and 2000 (and, of course, the 
previous year for the following tenure). Since just some municipalities adopted the 
program in the period analyzed it is possible to construct “control” groups to compare 
with the “treatment group” (municipalities adopting OP - hereafter OP municipalities). 
 
If the “willing to pay” argument was correct we would expect that OP municipalities 
would have a better fiscal performance had they not adopted the program. In theory, we 
would expect a better performance in property taxes than in service taxes
2 since the 
focus of the program is the individual although small and medium enterprises might be 
well represented by their owners in the participatory process. Accordingly, we will 
attempt to test if there is any significant impact on the growth of total own revenue, 
property taxes or in service taxes. 
 
The allocation argument is much more difficult to test and the problem is not data 
availability but difficulty in controlling for goals. For instance, we may have a 
municipality expanding “too much” in education and another one expending “too little”. 
Both adopted the OP and improved the allocation but the impact of the OP on education 
expenses is zero. The study attempts to check the impact on education and health 
expenses controlling for outcomes using years of schooling for education and infant 
mortality for health. It is expected that, if the allocation argument is correct, OP 
municipalities would have a lower change in education (health) expenses for a given 
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change in years of schooling (infant mortality). It is also expected that OP 
municipalities would expend more in expenses actually controlled by the participatory 
budget process (investments) than on expenses not open for vote (operational costs 
specially wages). This possible allocation impact will be tested using either the variation 
in investment and in operational costs. 
 
From the social point of view, the allocation argument should work the other way 
around, i.e. it is expected that OP municipalities would increase (reduce) years of 
schooling (infant mortality) for a given change in education (health) expenses. Notice 
that we are not worried about causalities in this sense. It does not matter for the 
purposes of this study if the (public) education system has (relatively) improved without 
changes in the expenses or if the expenses were (relatively) reduced not affecting the 
(public) education outcome. The program may have a budget improvement, a related 
social improvement or both. In other words, this paper is not testing how to improve the 
efficiency in education or health services but to assess possible (relative) impacts of the 
OP program on that efficiency. 
 
Finally, the distributive hypothesis might be tested using data on poverty or a synthetic 
measure of income distribution such as the Gini index
3. The problem is that such 
information is just available in demographic census years. So, the only way to test it is 
comparing two census years. Apart from technical issues there is a main difficulty in 
comparing indices that are 9 years apart
4. The period comprises two tenures: one from 
1993 to 1996 and another from 1997 to 2000. We could analyze just the municipalities 
that have implemented the OP on the two periods but this would give us just 17 
municipalities making the statistical analysis not very robust. The alternative is testing if 
there was an effect on the municipalities that implemented the program in any tenure 
within the decade. The alternative would be testing if the OP had an impact on the 
number of illiterates or in the number of primary school drop outs what can be done for 
the two tenures separate
5. 
 
The OP in Porto Alegre has been considered as one of the main cases of success in 
governance at the sub national level. Accordingly, the program was considered one of 
the cases of best practice in the world by the 1996 meeting of the Habitat
6. There is a 
consensus that the OP in Porto Alegre was responsible for a more progressive (spatial) 
expenditure distribution and increased citizenship. Not withstanding, there are very few 
quantitative studies checking if those statement are correct. The few studies attempting 
to assess the impact includes Marchetti (2004), Baiocchi et al. (2006) and Zamboni 
(2007). To the best of our knowledge those are the only quantitative studies about the 
subject. 
 
Marchetti (2004) was probably the first author attempting an empirical evaluation of the 
program. The author concludes that the OP in Porto Alegre has improved the (spatial) 
distribution of public goods. His research has some limitations though. The author 
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neglected a contra factual while studying OP since his analysis contemplated only the 
Porto Alegre case. The simultaneity with the new constitution is simply ignored 
compromising all results. Moreover, his attempt to show that OP induced the 
municipality to spend more in poorer regions is also debatable. In Porto Alegre there is 
a technical rule which privileges regions with higher population and lower average 
income. The result observed in the spatial distribution of municipal investment just 
shows that the rule works but does not guarantee that the OP helped implementing the 
rule. Therefore, it is not possible to separate the impact of the OP from the other events 
that were happening simultaneously. 
 
Zamboni (2007) initial results suggest that municipalities that implemented the OP were 
less likely to have corruption than municipalities that did not implement the program. 
Using audit reports, Zamboni (2007) analyzes a set of Brazilian municipalities through a 
pair-matching analysis. He concludes that in municipalities where OP was implemented 
the likelihood of corruption was lower than in non OP municipalities. The author also 
suggests that the public participation in local public administration is more relevant to 
governance than the attendance to elections. These results confirm some of OP goals 
and suggest that the OP may act as an effective constrain to Executive during the budget 
implementation as well. Although Zamboni (2007) does have some methodological 
similitude with this study, the variable of interest in Zamboni (2007) is corruption while 
this study is mainly interested with fiscal performance, municipal resources allocation 
and welfare changes. 
 
Although there are very few quantitative analysis of OP programs, there are an 
extensive literature on the possible consequences of OP implementation on democracy. 
Most of the studies are theoretical or case studies. The main conclusion from the studies 
is that OP drastically increases democratic participation. With direct consultation form, 
OP becomes a powerful tool to reduce problems of representative democracy. Its 
authors and supporters sustain that OP produces a “democratic radicalization” process. 
As Genro and Souza (1997) state, with no intermediaries between public needs and 
government action, OP programs would benefit the entire community. 
 
Moreover, public participation would enforce a change in citizenship and consequently 
in public-private relationship. As the citizens get closer to public decision, they will 
better understand what is the government and the state role and will be able to improve 
their participation in public life. Citizens will become more engaged and concerned with 
the public sphere in a new way. This ‘new citizenship’ will be forged by public 
discussion and by the conflict resolution through public dialog.  
 
Considering these points together, OP would guide the municipality to a higher 
development level. Silva and Carvalho (2006) state that this is one of the most relevant 
reasons given as a rationale for OP implementation. Higher level of democracy, more 
political engagement and better public expenditure. All together would induce the 
municipality to a much better situation had the municipality not implemented the 
program. It is interesting that so few quantitative analyses were undertaken since the 
claims are very much testable despite the technical difficulties. 
 
Although OP claims to empower population in a country where the relationship 
between civil society and government is problematic, the lack of evaluation gives room 
to doubts about its capacity to reach that purpose. Critical studies are important because   5
they call the attention to an important fact that has not been systematically evaluated so 
far: how better is OP practices compared to budget practices introduced by 1988 
Brazilian Constitution? Both were created at the same time and explanations that 
support the OP criticized a model that new Constitution was also attempting to change. 
The choice of direct democracy used in OP represents a high cost for the population. 
There is a clear trade-off that each individual faces comparing costs and benefits of 
taking part in meetings to decide the budget. The cost is relatively high and the benefits 
are uncertain and happen in the middle run: a new school, a new hospital or the 
pavement of streets take time to build and, thus, to perceive. 
 
Fostering democracy, OP can be described as a new formal institution attempting to 
change patterns in the relationship between government and the civil society, depending 
on the previous history. Yet there is no formal model to OP in such approach; so far the 
literature focuses in describing its implementation and the main actors in the process. 
To the best of our knowledge, Baiocchi et al (2006) made the first attempt to formalize 
the circumstances that allow the raising of such practice. The report shows that 
municipalities ruled by PT (Labor Party) has (considerable) higher likelihood of 
introducing OP than a city ruled by any other party. There is also strong support for the 
effect of political and civil society factors (agents), as well as some support for the main 
constraining effect of social and demographic contexts, and clear support for the 
importance of municipal resource bases. 
 
The main difference in this study and Baiochi et al. (2006) is the unit of analysis and the 
methodology that may be clearer in the following sections. The unit of analysis adopted 
in this study is the municipality and the tenure. Baiocchi et al. (2006) uses a cross 
section computing the change in some variables between 1991 and 2000 as dependent, 
i.e. their unit of analysis is just the municipality. This study uses the difference in the 
outcome between each administration, i.e. 1992 to 1996; 1996 to 2000 and 2000 to 2004. 
The difference is not trivial since one cannot mix administrations when analyzing a 
public management issue. For instance, if the impact of the OP vanishes in four years, it 
would be not expected to find any impact in municipalities implementing the OP from 
1993 to 1996 and then not keeping the program from 1997 to 2000. Also, there is a 
technical difference in the estimation technique. In this study the decision to implement 
(or not) the program is explicitly taken into account when computing the impact of OP 
in the variables of interest as will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2. Econometric Strategy 
 
The question that this report attempts to answer is essentially the same as the evaluation 
of any social program (e.g. a training program). A standard method for evaluating social 
programs uses the outcomes of non-participants to estimate what participants would 
have experienced had they not participated in the program. The difference between 
participants and non-participants outcomes would be the estimated gross impact of the 
program. The strategy proposed in this study is to use exactly this estimative as a 
measure of the impact of the OP on the selected variables, that is the gross impact of the 
OP will be measured by the difference between the outcomes of municipalities adopting 
OP (hereafter OP municipalities) vis a vis municipalities that did not adopt the policy 
(hereafter non-OP municipalities). 
   6
The main shortcoming of the analysis is the same as in the evaluation of social 
programs. The outcomes of non-OP municipalities may differ systematically from what 
the outcomes of OP municipalities would have been without adopting the OP, 
producing selection bias in estimated impacts. Following the literature on social 
program evaluation
7  it will be assumed that each municipality has two possible 
outcomes: 
) 0 ( ) 1 (   and   t t Y Y  in the OP and non-OP states, in period t, respectively
8. The 
gross impact of adopting the OP could be measured by 
) 0 ( ) 1 (
t t t Y Y − = Δ . The problem of 
evaluation arises because only 
) 0 ( ) 1 ( or    t t Y Y  is observed for each municipality but never 
both. That is, it is impossible to know the outcome of a municipality had it not adopted 
the OP given that it adopted the program. The alternative is comparing the OP 
municipalities with non-OP municipalities conditional on observed variables. 
 
To make this comparison the outcome of municipality i in period t (Yit) is assumed to 
depend on a vector of (observed) municipalities characteristics (Xit). The over 
performance associated with implementing a participatory budget process depend on a 
dummy variable (dit) that equals 1 if the municipality implemented the OP in the 
previous period and 0 otherwise. To account for unobserved characteristics, a mean zero 
disturbance (Uit) is assumed. A linear version of this specification is: 
 
k t U Y
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Where k is the period when the OP was actually implemented, E(Uit) = 0 and Uit is 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across municipalities. That is, the main 
goal of this study is estimating α. The decision of implementing a OP may be 
determined by the party in power, the (representative) voters or both. Whatever the 
specific content of the rule, it can be described in terms of an index function framework. 
Let INi be an index of benefits (to the appropriate decision maker) of implementing a 













   (2) 
 
To estimate α a very complete set of information is need (that is rarely available) or 
additional assumptions have to be made regarding the (stochastic) dependence of the 
variables above. In many cases it is not possible to efficiently estimate α with cross-
section data if there is no regressors in equations (1) and (2). Most cross-section 
estimators require a regressand in the decision rule (2) although it is possible to avoid 
most of the requirements with longitudinal data. The vector of municipal characteristics 
is not very problematic for this study since it is well established that 1. municipality 
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characteristics do play a role in the outcome and 2. there exists a large amount of 
municipality characteristics at least for Census years (1991 and 2000)
9. 
 
The decision rule is not so straightforward. In a training program it is standard to use a 
discrete choice approach where the decision to join the program would be taken if the 
cost to join the program was lower than the (expected) permanent income generated by 
joining the program. Given the evidence in Brazil, the decision is very much connected 
to the proportion of votes for PT in the first round. This fact was first emphasized by 
Baiocchi et al (2006) and was used to select the comparable pairs in their study. This 




For this study a comprehensive database was built that, to the best of our knowledge, 
has not been used before for analyzing institutional changes in Brazilian municipalities. 
The data span information from 1991/1992 to 2004 with intermediate information on 
1996 and 2000. That is, the panel covers 12 year with four time periods
10. As is well 
known if there is selection bias and time dependent measurement errors at least 3 time 
periods are needed to analyze the impact of an intervention. Besides the statistical 
advantages of such a panel, the periods are very appropriate for the study goals. 
Considering that the 1991 census data is a good proxy for 1992 (structural) variables, 
our periods are coincident with the mayor tenure (1993 to 1996; 1997 to 2000; and 2001 
to 2004). So, the unit of analysis would be the municipality and its tenure. Given that 
the decision of having (or not) a participatory budget process is from the tenure this is a 
very coherent unit of analysis. 
 
One of the main differences between this data set and most of the data sets used for 
analyzing outcomes of Brazilian municipalities is the collection of structural data for 
1996. Most of the studies that needed structural variables compare 1991 with 2000 
because they rely on census data. This study used data from the 1996 counting and data 
from administrative records (RAIS) to add data for 1996. The problem with this strategy 
is that there is not as much data for this year as there is for census years. In other words, 
there is a trade off between the number of variables available and the time periods 
analyzed. In particular there are no distributive variables for 1996 or 2004. So, the 
analysis on the distributive impact will take into account just the two census period. 
 
The study compiled just fiscal and administrative records data for 2004. There is no 
structural source of data for this year. The idea is using lagged independent variables to 
avoid the problems related to measurement errors assuming that the measurement error 
is independently distributed across time. In other words all that is needed for 2004 is 
data for the dependent variable. So, it is not possible to actually use 4 time periods but 
just 3 of them in the specification used more often in the research. Either additional 
assumptions or instrumental variables will be used in analyses that use a sub-period of 
the panel. 
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10 Considering that the unit of analysis is the municipality the data is actually a panel and not a repeated 
cross section. However, it may be considered as a repeated cross-section if the unit of analysis was the 
individuals affected by the OP.   8
 
OP municipalities are in average more populated, richer, more productive, have higher 
formal wages, higher own revenues and more years of schooling, more infra-structure, 
etc. than non OP municipalities. So, there is a need for a controlled analysis. Regarding 
selection, as discussed above, one of the main differences in the two samples is the 
incidence of mayors from PT. From 1989 to 1992 more than half of the municipalities 
that have adopted the program were managed by a PT mayor. In this tenure PT had just 
1% of the mayors in the country. PT managed cities continued to be prevalent in the 
municipalities adopting OP process in any period. In the 1993-1996 tenure and in the 
1997-2000 period the share was similar to 1989-1992 (around 50%). The proportion 
diminishes to 30% just in the most recent period (2001-2004). Considering that the 
percentage of municipalities managed by PT have also increased considerably from the 
first to the last tenure under analysis (2% to 7%) the sample is more even in the last 
period than ever but it is still highly concentrated. Furthermore, in some of the 
municipalities implementing OP where PT was not elected, it had a large share on total 
votes or was in the wining coalition. 
 
Analyzing the outcome variables also requires a careful analysis. As mentioned above, 
OP municipalities have much more resources than the average Brazilian municipality. 
So, a “naïve” straight comparison between OP municipalities and non OP municipalities 
averages will certainly leads to the conclusion that the outcome of OP municipalities 
was much higher than the non OP municipalities. On the other hand, since most of the 
OP municipalities started from a higher level in the outcomes they may growth at a 
slower (faster) pace if there is convergence (divergence) in the period.  
 
So, the data shows that there are regressands both in the outcome, equation (1) as in the 
implementation decision, equation (2). So, using last section terminology, it means that 
it is necessary to estimate  ) , 1 ( it it it X d Y E =  and  ) , 0 ( it it it X d Y E = . The difference 
between the two estimates would be the ATE(X), that is, the estimate of the average 
impact of the OP on the outcome conditional on X. Assuming temporarily that there is 
no regressors in equation (2) and a linear behavior in equation (1), it is possible to 
estimate α regressing the outcome on 1, d and X. The coefficient on d would be a good 
estimate for the ATE. 
 
There is however a problem that usually arises in evaluating the impact of an 
intervention. To understand the problem, it will be assumed that X has only one dummy 
variable x
11. If all municipalities with x=1 participate in the program, it is not possible 
to estimate  ) 1 , 0 ( = = x d Y E it it , so it is not possible to estimate ATE(1). If some of the 
municipalities that have implemented the OP had x=0 and others not, it would be 
possible to estimate ATE(0) but the unconditional impact, i.e. P(x=0)ATE(0) + 
P(x=1)ATE(1) cannot be calculated. This imply that the population of interest might be 
redefined. 
 
A similar problem arises if the municipalities with x=0 never implemented the OP. 
Since it is not possible to calculate ATE(0) it is not possible to estimate the 
unconditional impact. The problem is a little different, though. In this case it is not 
possible to estimate the impact of the OP in municipalities that would never implement 
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it anyway. In the first situation, it is not possible to estimate the impact on 
municipalities that always implement the OP. For instance, if all PT municipalities had 
implemented the OP it would not be possible to estimate the impact unconditional on 
the municipality being managed by a PT mayor. However, if none municipality 
managed by a PFL mayor had never implemented the program, it would be possible to 
estimate the program impact on all other municipalities including the municipalities 
anaged by mayors from PT. 
r of votes 
r PT in the election but the performance is not correlated with this variable. 
ikely to implement such a program if it would pay off (or 
ot) actually implementing it. 
the period, there are approximately 3.5 thousand municipalities 
at can be analyzed.  
m
 
In practice there are both continuous as dummy variables determining the decision to 
implement the program. The strategy adopted was using a probit estimation for the 
likelihood of implementing the program. That is, it is estimated p(Z)≡P(dit=1|Z) 
assuming a spherical error (the propensity score). The propensity score was also used 
for improving the estimation of the ATE both in cross section as in the panel. Since the 
normal distribution is implicitly assumed, it is not possible to have p(Z)=0 or p(Z)=1. 
The strategy is eliminating municipalities close enough to zero and 1 probability. It is 
not a considerable problem if part of the variables in X are also in Z as far as there is 
one variable that is not in both sets. As discussed in the next two sections, the 
probability of implementing the program is highly correlated with the numbe
fo
 
The redefinition of the sample is not very problematic in this analysis. Fortunately, there 
are enough municipalities managed by PT mayors that did not adopted the OP so it is 
possible to estimate the impact of the program on PT municipalities as well. Eliminating 
municipalities from PT would jeopardize the analysis. There are more cases with the 
second type of problem. For instance, although there are few municipalities from the 
PFL that indeed adopted the program, in 1992 no municipality managed by a PFL 
mayor have implemented the OP. Also, small municipalities and with low years of 
schooling have to be deleted from the sample. It is not possible to say for the 
municipalities that are very unl
n
 
If all municipalities existent in 2000 existed already in 1991 and never split there would 
be 5,507 observation for each year, i.e. a total of 22,028 observations in the full sample. 
Actually, since the independent variables are lagged, there would be a maximum of 
16,521 observations to be analyzed. However from 1991 to 1996 around a thousand 
municipalities were created in Brazil. Since the unit of analysis is the municipality and 
the tenure, it is not possible to analyze (in the full sample) municipalities created after 
1991. But also municipalities that split in the period for creating a new one cannot be 
included in the sample. The sample is restricted to municipalities that were created 
before 1991 and had never split until 2004. Excluding municipalities that were created 
after 1991 or split in 
th
 
Furthermore some variables are not available for the whole period. However, there is a 
large coincidence between municipalities that were excluded because it was not possible 
to estimate the unconditional and municipalities that did not have data. This coincidence 
is probably connected to the fact that smaller and poorer municipalities are less likely to 
report their data. Depending on the variables included the (pooled) sample used in the 
analysis varies from less than 4 thousand to more than 8 thousand observations but most   10
of the specifications have more than 7 thousand potential observations. A balanced 
al question is why would the PT need such a governance scheme 
nce they had the power. In other words, why not implementing more efficiency and 
ry) recent spread to other parties may be a consequence of 
e success of the process and political competition pushing all parties to increase 
number of votes for the candidate he or she is supporting. 
he OP could generate a mass of political canvassers that would considerably increase 
d it is important to check if the OP decision was 
orrelated with any variable of interest. If this was the case, the study would have to 
panel would have around 6 thousand observations. 
 
4. The decision to implement OP: an empirical approach 
 
The decision to implement OP process by the municipality is clearly a political decision. 
In this paper it is assumed that this decision represents an institutional break. Since the 
decision was connected to the labor party (PT) taken the power, it may be argued as in 
Acemoglu et al (2006) that the poor was taken the power in an inefficient and captured 





One argument is that the inefficient government would provide more rent for the 
bureaucrats. There might be a hidden collusion between the rich and bureaucrats that 
would not allow the incoming party to change the status quo. The interrelation between 
technocrats and the elite in Brazil was studied in the seminal book by Bresser Pereira 
(1981) and point out in this direction. Acemoglu et al (2006) show that in order to 
generate enough political support, the coalition of the rich and bureaucrats may not only 
choose an inefficient organization of the state, but they may further expand the size of 
bureaucracy so as to gain additional votes. So, the OP would be necessary to break this 
coalition. This argument would explain why the process is very much biased towards 
PT administrations. The (ve
th
efficiency and distribution. 
 
Another alternative would be that the OP was just an electoral strategy. The PT had to 
differentiate itself from other parties (and that may be the reason why Olivio Dutra 
defined the OP as “The PT way of public management”) and the OP was very appealing 
for this purpose. Also, the electoral scheme in Brazil is very much based on “political 
canvassers” (cabos eleitorais). Those are individuals that during elections are 
responsible for increasing the 
T
the likelihood of (re)election. 
 
In this section it will not be formally defined a model to explain the decision to 
implement (or not) the OP. Instead a very empirical strategy will be adopted. It will be 
estimated using a probit model which variables can significantly explain the likelihood 
that a municipality will adopt the OP. The goal of the empirical strategy is twofold. First 
it is important to understand the political decision to correctly analyze the impact of the 
OP on the variables of interest. Secon
c
deal with some estimation problems. 
 
The variables expected to influence the municipality decision were briefly discussed 
above. First some fiscal variables may be connected to the decision. Municipalities with 
high tax in order to extract rent to the elite and bureaucrats would be more likely to 
implement such a scheme considering that Bresser Pereira (1981) argument formalized 
by Acemoglu et al (2006) is correct. This argument also suggests that it is a must to   11
estimate the influence of electoral variables on the political decision. Second, there 
might be a scale factor. Large cities may have resources to implement such a scheme 
at would not be possible for small cities. A similar argument can be made regarding 
 OP meaning that the 
nalysis of public (local) expenditure performance will be easier to handle. Total own 
ase consistently. It 
ems that the connection between the decision to implement the OP and fiscal revenues 
y PSDB, 
MDB and PFL the signs and magnitudes of the party dummies are consistent with the 
adopt more 
fficient and distributive policies to increase the likelihood of re-election. The sign is 
                                                
th
rich cities vis a vis poor cities. 
 
The first set of regression attempt to check for the fiscal variable and for the proxy for 
income if the logarithm is a better measure than the per capita measure. The analysis 
reveals that the per capita measure is better for income proxies while the logarithm is a 
better measure for fiscal proxies. We also test which fiscal variable (if any) explains the 
decision do implement the OP. In this case it is also important to check all variables that 
will be used as proxies for the outcome. It turns out that just own revenues are 
significant for explaining the probability of implementing the
a
revenues, property taxes or service taxes are significant at 95%. 
 
Using the service tax as a proxy for the influence on the fiscal side on the municipality 
decision whether to implement the OP it is appealing since it is expected that the 
property tax will be more affected by the program than the service tax. The problem is 
that service taxes are highly correlated with the income proxy (average wages in the 
formal sector). So, another proxy for income, the per capita gross “local” product (GLP) 
is tested along with service taxes. The GLP is less correlated with service taxes than the 
average formal wages but the results seem to be spurious as well. When one of the 
variables is not considered the significance of the other would incre
se
is more related to the scale argument than to the “state capture” one. 
 
As stated before, the main variables influencing the decision to implement (or not) the 
OP is mainly political although the scale effect is very clear
12. The theoretical reason for 
the political influence is confirmed by the data. A PT mayor explains more than 1/3 of 
the decision to implement the OP. All other parties are not significant in defining if the 
OP will be implemented or not except the PFL that decreases the likelihood of 
implementation. Actually, from 1989 to 1992 and from 1993 to 1996 there was none 
municipality implementing OP from PFL. This result may confirm the hypothesis that 
the OP was part of the strategy to improve the efficiency and distribution given that the 
PFL is in theory the most right-wing party taken into account in the control variables. 
As a matter of fact considering that the most left-wing party is PT followed b
P
statement that more left oriented parties are more likely to implement the OP. 
 
Another political variable included in the regression was the political competitiveness. 
This variable is defined as the difference of the logarithm of the number of votes to the 
elected mayor and the second candidate in the first round. A small difference would 
mean that the competition is tight in the municipality. It was expected that this variable 
would be negative since more competition would encourage the mayor to 
e
the expected but the variable is not significant in most of the specifications. 
 
 
12 Biderman et al (2005) show that most of sophisticated public policies are very rarely implemented in 
small municipalities.   12
We also test alternative variables representing the political side of OP implementation 
decision. First, instead of using a dummy for PT two continuous variables were used: 
the votes for PT when the party elected the mayor and the votes for PT when its 
candidate was not elected. Both variables were significant but the sign of the later is 
negative. A possible interpretation for this result is that OP implementation was very 
much linked with PT. So, a politician attempting to differentiated him or herself from 
PT could not adopt a policy that is associated with PT. This result would reinforce the 
OP as an electoral strategy rather than a public management strategy. Then it was tested 
changing all party dummies by their interaction with the elected mayor votes. This 
specification do not change any of the results obtained when using the dummies. Then 
the political competition variable was decomposed in two: competition between PT 
elected mayors and other parties and the competition between non PT elected mayors 
and other parties. Just the competition between PT elected mayors and other parties was 
significant and positive meaning that more competition between PT and the second 
candidate would decrease the likelihood that OP would be implemented. Finally the 
political competition variable was decomposed further in 3: competition between non 
PT elected mayors with non PT second candidates; competition between non PT elected 
mayors and PT second candidates; and the competition between PT elected mayors and 
other parties second candidate already used in the previous specification. The later 
ic) education outcome. So, it controls for the quality 
 education expenditure and is a measure of efficiency (controlling for expenditure in 
y be underestimated for personal concerns what is not so 
sual for years of schooling. The second possibility is that more educated citizens 
 implementation; and it is 
political competition variable was the only significant in both decompositions showing 
that the decomposition of the political competition do not add very much to the analysis. 
 
Although per capita Gross Local Product or average formal wages seem to be a more 
direct measure of municipality aggregate income, a more indirect control for 
municipality income is tested namely years of schooling. As discussed before, years of 
schooling is also a proxy for (publ
in
education). So, it is important to test the significance of years of schooling on the 
likelihood of OP implementation. 
 
Including years of schooling as a proxy for income in the municipality makes the most 
significant fiscal variables (in the previous specifications) not significant at 95%. Also, 
years of schooling is the income proxy with more explanation power for the likelihood 
of implementing the OP. There are two possible explanations for this result. First the 
other proxies for income are usually measured with errors. The GLP is estimated based 
on other variables; average wages in formal employment does not consider the informal 
side of the economy (by definition) that represents in average 40% of total employment; 
the self declared income ma
u
would be more willing to participate what is compatible with the political economy 
arguments discussed above. 
 
Based on these specifications it is possible to choose a parsimonious specification 
where all variables are significant at 95% in most of the specifications. This 
specification is the natural candidate for the estimates of the impact of OP. In any 
specification municipalities that have implemented the OP in the previous year were 
more likely to implement it in the following year; larger and richer municipalities were 
more likely to implement the OP; municipalities where a mayor from PT was elected 
were more likely to implement the OP but an increase in the votes for PT when the 
mayor from PT was not elected reduce the likelihood of OP  13
more likely to have OP in the 3 major regions in Brazil (Northeast, Southeast and 
 
lthough the implementation in the previous period is still significant at 90%. This 
tiation” is accepted, it seems that this 
ifferentiation is vanishing. However, the votes for PT when its candidate is elected is 
 still a policy very connected with 
T but is not consigned to the party anymore. 
 uses 
e same two steps strategy except that the OP dummy is instrumented by the estimated 
 OLS estimators, method (3) is probably the most 
liable. However, the fixed effect (hereafter FE) method is more reliable than any other 
South). The parsimonious specification kept the political variables that are not 
significant since they are not correlated with other variables. 
 
We also run the parsimonious specification using the panel characteristic of the data, i.e. 
running a random effects probit model for the likelihood of OP implementation. The 
only change in significance is on the lagged OP implementation variable that was 
significant at 95% in every other specification not controlling for random effects,
a
result is rather interesting since it shows that the significance of implementing OP in the 
previous year may be just proxying for idiosyncratic characteristics of the municipality. 
 
It is interesting to notice that the PFL dummy is not significant for the likelihood of 
implementation from 2001 to 2004. Another related result is that the votes for PT when 
its candidate was not elected is also not significant in the last period of analysis. These 
results are showing that the OP program was moving from a “PT way of government” 
to a more general policy adopted by multiple parties. If the argument that the negative 
coefficient on the competition between non-PT and PT mayors (when the non-PT 
mayor is elected) is due to “party differen
d
still very significant even from 2001 to 2004. So, it is
P
 
5. Assessing the impact of the OP implementation 
 
To analyze the impact of the OP controlling for observables 6 different estimators were 
generated. The first one is a naïve estimator just running an OLS regression including 
the main determinants of the performance variable but adding a dummy variable for OP 
implementation in the period. The second estimator is done in two steps. In the first step 
the probability of OP implementation is estimated using a parsimonious probit model 
and then adding the estimated probability to the OLS estimation. The third method
th
probability and the other independent variables. Methods (4) to (6) is equivalent to 
methods (1) to (3), respectively, except that fixed effects are used instead of OLS. 
 
The main result, i.e. the impact of the treatment on the treated, is presented on Table 1. 
The OP dummy is significant in some OLS estimations especially in method (3) where 
the implementation is instrumented. However, it is not significant in most results using 
fixed effects. So, results relying on OLS estimation like Baiocchi et al (2006) may be 
biased. Part of the endogeneity between OP implementation and performance is 
corrected by methods (2) and (3). The assumptions necessary to have the correct 
estimation of the impact of OP in method (3) are less restrictive than the assumptions 
needed for method (2). So, within the
re
OLS method since it is the only method that actually controls for the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the municipalities. 
 
Based on method (3) the evidence is showing that the OP had a positive impact on 
current revenues, on tax revenues and on property taxes but not on service sale taxes. 
This result is consistent with the expectations. However, this result does not survive the   14
FE estimation controlling or not for the implementation decision. Method (3) has also 
some results that, if accepted, would be bad news for the program. OP municipalities 
are expending more in operational expenses, education and health. Increasing the 
xpenditures in operational items is not desirable since it would be expected that 
vestment expenses would be increased. However, since the revenues were increasing 
n general) it may be the case that all expenses increased as well. 







Table 4: I t of OP im ementa  on fiscal   social v ables. 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Currente  0.092 0.026  0.224 0.015 0.020 -0.018 
Revenue (0 *  (0 *  .023)** (0.029) .043)** (0.026)  (0.031) (0.06) 
Tax  0.072 0.011  0.187 -0.034  -0.039 -0.045 
Revenue ( (   0.053)  (0.066)  0.092)** (0.063)  (0.074)  (0.136) 
Property  0.133  -0.023 0.319 0.044 0.035  0.125 
Tax ( (   0.083)  (0.105)  0.127)** (0.076)  (0.086)  (0.151) 
Service  0.043 0.035  0.122 0.033 0.018  0.111 
Tax (0.087)  (0.105)  (0.146) (0.114) (0.127)  (0.231) 
Operational 0.130  0.046  0.545 0.012 -0.010 0.207 
Costs (0 *  (0 *  .042)** (0.046)  .103)** (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.185) 
Investment 0.158 0.031  0.354 -0.122 -0.053 -0.214 
 (0   (   .071)** (0.087)  0.123)** (0.082)  (0.094)  (.178) 
Education 0.126  -0.063 0.481 0.010 0.007 -0.028 
   (0.077)  (0.093)  (0   .121)*** (0.069)  (0.091)  (0.157) 
Health  0.499 0.185  2.020 0.364 0.210  2.095 
Expenditures  (0 *  (  (0   (0 (  (0   .102)** 0.112)* .254)*** .122)*** 0.126)* .458)***
GLP  -0.106  0.044 -0.365  -0.023  0.024 -0.225 
  (0   (0   (0   .029)*** (0.036)  .048)*** (0.034)  (0.038)  .079)***
Average  0.028 0.028 -0.013  -0.051  0.003 -0.228 
Wages ( (0   0.041)  (0.041)  (0.071)  (0.04)  (0.046)  .085)***
Infant -0.027  -0.027  -0.055 -0.029 -0.027  -0.054 
Mortality (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.036) (0.028) (0.031)  (0.058) 
Illiterates 0.000  0.000  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 
    (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) 
Drop-outs -0.003  -0.003  -0.005 -0.003 -0.003  -0.004 
1er school  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)*** (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.003) 
Years of  0.164  0.164  0.328 0.145 0.145  0.104 
Schooling (0.052)***  (0.052)***  (0.084)***  (0.073)**  (0.073)**  (0.148) 
*** - 1% sign.; ** - 5% sign.; * - 10% sign.             
Source: Estimated by the author based on IBGE demographic census (2000). 
 
A higher expenditure in either education or health controlling for the outcome is much 
more problematic. The positive impact is telling that an OP municipality spent more in 
education than a non OP municipality that had exactly the same performance in years of 
schooling. So, the efficiency of OP municipalities in education is lower than the non OP 
counterparts. The result is also observed in health expenditures. An OP municipality 
with the same change in infant mortality as a non OP municipality would expend more 
in health. For health the result is confirmed in most of the FE estimation what may be a 
ery problematic result. That is, even considering that the OLS estimation should not be  v
taken into account, the result for health expenditure survive the FE estimation and may 
be revealing some problems in the OP implementation.   15
 
Although the estimated parameters indicate a lower efficiency in health expenditure for 
OP municipalities vis a vis non OP municipalities, the result may be driven by the 
spillover problem in health services provision. As discussed before, the improvement in 
health public facilities may attract citizens from other municipalities to use those 
facilities. The health system may not work properly since the pressure from an 
creasing demand would require more resources allocated to health that would increase 
e serving a region larger than the municipality. Given 
ose previous results, certainly, a more detailed study is needed to understand the 
le to increase the welfare of the citizens faster than non 
P municipalities. Since the way it is revealed is through formal education there might 
e than the non OP counterparts. These results are very worrisome 
nce method (6) is the most robust method adopted in the estimation. It is revealing just 
nefits at least from the point of view of efficiency and 
ggregate outcomes. 
attributes of the municipalities (observed and idiosyncratic). Since some municipalities 
in
the demand further pressuring again the municipal health system. If OP municipalities 
originally increased the resources in health they may be facing this problem. 
 
It is also possible that the OP did have a perverse effect on health services. For instance, 
the participation process may be inducing the municipality to over invest in health 
facilities instead of human resources connected to health. A reallocation of the resources 
from physical to human capital may increase the efficiency of the system. But the OP 
structure may favor physical capital over human capital since servant wages that 
represent a big part of the expenses are not subject to the participatory process. Of 
course the data collected and the methodology adopted for this paper does not allow 
such inference, i.e. it is not possible to assure if the OP municipalities are actually less 
efficient in Health or if they wer
th
impact of OP on public health services provision and maybe propose some specific 
policies to improve the process. 
 
The result that is favorable to OP implementation is in the last row of Table 4. OP 
municipalities increased the years of schooling at a higher pace than non-OP 
municipalities. Since years of schooling is a good proxy for both income as poverty 
(more years of schooling being associated with less poverty) this is a very interesting 
result. OP municipalities were ab
O
have been an increase in education expenditure efficiency that is not revealed in the 
education expenditure variable. 
 
On the other hand, the results using method (6) are very unfavorable for the OP 
program. The problematic positive impact on health expenditure is significant using this 
method and the positive impact on years of schooling is not significant anymore. 
Besides, there is a significant and negative coefficient both on GLP as on average 
formal wages. This result means that OP municipalities production and income have 
grown at a lower pac
si





This paper attempted to assess the impact of implementing a participatory budget 
program on many fiscal and social variables. To perform this task a counter factual type 
analysis was carried over. The impacted was assessed comparing the performance of 
municipalities that adopted the program (called OP municipalities) with municipalities 
that have not adopted the program (non OP municipalities) controlling for the main   16
implemented the program in different periods and the decision to implement the 
program is more connected to political (electoral) variables that are usually not related 
 the performance variable the program represents a unique opportunity to do a natural 
ontrolling for census variables. As is well 
nown using census micro data it is possible to tabulate many indices at the municipal 
s, citizens that 
re willing to participate in the budget decision) is willing to change this situation, the 
re of the OP to break the coalition. However, 
 there was not such a coalition in the municipalities where the OP was implemented, 




To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt using this methodology and 
database. The main attribute of the database is that the panel is compatible with 
municipality mayor tenure. It is possible to collect data for 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 
that corresponds to the last year of each tenure since 1992. Assuming that 1991 census 
data is a good proxy for 1992, it is possible to add information for 1992 and 2000. Since 
the analysis used lagged independent variables it is possible to analyze the 
municipalities implementing OP between 2001 and 2004 together with the 
municipalities implementing the program between 1993 and 1997. So, it is possible to 
explore the panel characteristic of the sample c
k
level that are impossible for any other period. 
 
It is expected that the OP program will increase efficiency and distribution under some 
assumptions on the political equilibrium and the impact of the program on such 
equilibrium. This may be the case if the political equilibrium is “elite-bureaucrats 
coalition” type that may happen when the state is captured by the rich. To keep its rent 
capture it is necessary to adopt an inefficient state. To support such equilibrium in 
democracy the coalition with the bureaucracy should increase consistently the size of 
the bureaucracy in order to cope with the necessary votes (Bresser Pereira [1981], 
Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni [2006]). Breaking those ties might be difficult 
especially considering the negotiation in the municipal legislative where most groups of 
interest are still represented. The OP moves part of the budget allocation decision both 
from the executive as from the legislative. If “participatory people” (that i
a
OP would increase both efficiency in the public spending as distribution. 
 
As it may be clear in the paragraph above, it is necessary to test two simultaneous 
assumptions that are not separable. It is assumed at the same time that the political 
equilibrium is “rich-bureaucrats coalition” type and that the OP would break this 
coalition. It is possible to test just one of the assumptions. In this report a non 
significant result was associated with a failu
if
the result would not be significant as well. 
 
If there was no “coalition-type” problem in the municipal government it would be worth 
discussing why the program was implemented in the first place. There might be some 
other goals in the OP program that are not connected with efficiency or distribution. The 
non significance would be expected since those were not the goals of the program. In 
other words, the dependent variables were not actually representing the goals of the 
program. In this paper it was assumed that the goals of the program were toward 
allocation efficiency and/or income distribution through public goods allocation within 
the city. These might be the general objectives of the program but our variables may be 
beyond the OP capacity. Also the goals could be different such as improving the 
“empowerment” of citizens. One side of the empowerment goal was indirectly tested,   17
would be “happier” with the (local) government and will be more willing to pay taxes. 
So, OP municipalities would have larger fiscal revenue than non OP municipalities. 
owever no evidence was found in this direction. 
 lost some 
nique identification characteristics that it used to have when it was smaller. 
there is selection bias in both population and income as for 
olitical party of the mayor. 
re connected with 
iosyncrasies of the municipality then with the previous experience. 
ause 
 did not control for income or underestimate it for not controlling for population. 
H
 
The likelihood of implementing the OP is very much connected to the PT performance 
in municipal elections. When the PT mayor is elected, more votes he or she gets, the 
higher the likelihood of OP implementation. However, if the PT mayor is not elected his 
or her votes reduce the likelihood of OP implementation. Such characteristic of the 
implementation decision suggests that the decision is very much identified with PT. A 
mayor in a municipality facing high competition from PT would differentiate him or 
herself not adopting the program. The result could also be interpreted differently. 
Municipalities with a strong PT would be the ones more likely to change the political 
equilibrium. So, if the winner party did not want to change the equilibrium, it could not 
adopt the OP. It is worth noticing, however that the proportion of mayors from PT 
reduced considerably in the last round of programs analyzed in this paper (i.e. from 
2001 to 2004). This observation may be connected to the fact that the PT
u
 
As most of sophisticated public policies, the OP is more concentrated in larger and 
richer municipalities. This is a problem since most of the performance variables selected 
for the analysis are also correlated with income or size. It is possible to control for this 
endogeneity problem however since PT votes usually do not influence the performance 
variables. It was also verified that the likelihood of implementation is probably not 
correlated with initial fiscal conditions. So, there is no selection bias problem from the 
fiscal point of view although 
p
 
One of the main contributions of this paper is working with a panel consistent with the 
mayor tenure. This characteristic allows the analysis to control for municipality 
idiosyncrasies using fixed or random effects estimates. Using this feature and estimating 
a random effect model to estimate the likelihood of OP implementation confirm the 
main findings except the dependence on the lagged implementation. All other 
specifications found that municipalities that have implemented the program in a tenure 
were more likely to implement it in the next tenure except the random effect 
specification. The implementation in the previous period may be mo
id
 
The performance variables were selected to represent 3 groups of concerns. The first 
concern was with the empowerment hypothesis tested indirectly using fiscal revenues. 
The second concern was with public efficiency. To test for public efficiency 
expenditure data was selected and tested controlling for the service outcome. The third 
concern was with distribution. Distributive proxies were tested along with proxies for 
poverty. As expected most of the performance variables are connected with initial 
income of the municipality. The relationship with size is more complex. Some 
performance variables are not related with size. The more usual correlation favors 
smaller municipalities. Since OP municipalities are biased toward richer and larger 
cities, a simple comparison between averages could overestimate the difference bec
it
   18
In most of the specifications the performance variables were not correlated with PT 
votes as mentioned before. The political variable that did influence the performance 
more often was political competition measured as the difference between the logarithm 
of votes for the mayor candidate ranked first and second in the first round. Using a 
parsimonious version of the specification derived in this analysis 6 different methods 
were applied to estimate the impact of OP implementation on the variables of interest 
hange in each mayor tenure. Four of the methods did control for the likelihood of OP 
re not significant because some of 
e variables analyzed were very structural. So either the impact of the OP was not 
e insignificant. If this is the case it worth estimating the impact on each 
roup since the type I (in this example) would be a bad policy while the type II would 
 the amount available for investment; expenses on 
ducation and health, controlling for years of schooling; and on health expenses 
c
implementation and 3 of the methods explored the panel characteristic of the data. 
 
The program has not presented any significant impact in most of the performance 
variables in many specifications. For instance, in the methods estimated by fixed effects 
just 6 variables were impacted by the OP in 39 possibilities. The impacts are more 
pronounced in the methods that did not explore the panel characteristic of the data. In 
particular the procedure that instrumented for OP implementation using the estimated 
probability of implementation and all other attributes that define the performance as 
instrument, shows that OP was significant in 9 out of 13 variables analyzed. The non 
significance may be connected with many causes. There might have a measure problem 
in some variables that would be driving the results down. As a matter of fact, methods 
that used instrumental variables found more performance variables where the OP was 
significant. Also it may be the case that the impacts a
th
noticeable or it would require more time to show up. 
 
There is also the problem in the measurement of the dummy variable. That is, we are 
mixing municipalities that may have different OP programs. Baiocchi et al. (2006) 
proposes a typology that separate binding from non-binding programs. Their case 
studies show a very different pattern in each type of program. However, for this 
heterogeneity to generate a insignificant result it may be the case that in a two-type 
space type I municipalities might perform worse so type II would perform better and the 
average would b
g
be a good one. 
 
If the non significant results may not be telling a complete story of the program impact, 
results that are significant but in the opposite direction that would be a program goal 
might be a big concern for the policy maker. Some significant results are not very 
favorable for the program. Using the pooled regression with instrument variables, 
method (3), the revenue of OP municipalities was larger than the non OP municipalities 
for all revenue variables tested except for service sales tax what is compatible with the 
empowerment hypothesis. However, using this method, it has also a positive effect on 
operational expenses, reducing
e
controlling for infant mortality. 
 
An increase in education expenses controlling for years of schooling is a bad sign since 
it means that OP municipalities would expend more in education than non OP 
municipalities with the same outcome in education services measured by years of 
schooling. However this impact was significant just on method (3). However, the 
positive impact on health is significant at 90% for any method and at 99% in 4 methods. 
The OP seems to decrease the efficiency on health expenditure and not the opposite as it   19
was expected. As discussed before this might be connected to a spillover effect where 
OP municipalities furnish health services for the neighbor municipalities. It is possible 
 control for this effect using infant mortality over the number of infants actually 
the education system. The 
oalition between the elite and the bureaucracy would guarantee the inefficiency needed 
ow slower than in non OP municipalities; and the average salaries in the 
rmal sector would grow at a lower pace in OP municipalities than in the non OP 
me standard experimented in the past. 
inally, the lack of skill from the participants may end up proposing a less efficient 
with mayor 
to
treated in the city regardless of place of living. 
 
On the other hand the program may have had a positive impact on education service 
outcome. In 5 methods the OP was significant and positive in the growth of years of 
schooling controlling for the municipality education expenditure change. Since 
education is very much connected with both income level and distribution this is a result 
favorable for the program. Also, the impact of OP implementation on primary school 
dropout rate is negative and significant at 99% in all non panel methods and significant 
at 90% in panel methods (4) and (5). So, the OP may be improving the delivery and 
distribution of education in the municipalities that have adopted the program. It may be 
argued that the way the state was captured was through 
c
for capturing rent using the public education (non) delivery. 
 
The only caveat with the above analysis is that the impact is not significant for both 
years of schooling as for primary school dropouts using method (6). Method (6) is the 
more robust method used in this paper. It controls for fixed effects, that is, adopt what is 
called a difference in difference approach and, at the same time, instrument for OP 
implementation to correct for problems in the dummy variable. Using this method the 
OP would have 3 significant impacts all toward inefficiency. The OP would increase 





In brief, the results are mixed but they do show that there are many concerns with OP 
implementation. All concerns would need a more detailed study to fully understand it 
but it is possible that OP municipalities are deteriorating the quality of the health service 
delivery with no positive impact on the fiscal health of the municipality and may even 
be slowing up income and production growth. One explanatory hypothesis is that the 
program was captured by other(s) group(s) of interested that is (are) capturing more rent 
from the state than the former coalition. Another source of problem may reside on the 
proposed budget vis a vis the executed budget. The proposed budget may represent an 
improvement but the execution repeat the sa
F
budget than a panel of experts would produce. 
 
In any case, it is not likely that any kind of OP would have negative impact. It seems 
that there might be a type of participation that it is actually deleterious. It is also 
possible that some programs might be good. However, in general, the program is 
probably neutral. In any case, the decision whether to implement the OP or not might be 
from the people in the municipality. The researcher might find some practices that are 
more efficient than others given that the municipality decided to implement such a 
scheme. It is probably impossible to say if OP is essentially bad or good. It is difficult to 
say that dictatorship is bad from the economic point of view, let alone participatory 
democracy versus representative democracy. Maybe a public vote together   20
election deciding if the municipality should have a participatory budget or not would be 
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